Teoria da definição e princípio de causalidade na dedução do conatus
In the deduction of conatus in Part III of Ethics, Spinoza presents the same conclusion to the finite modes that he did in Part I concerning the power of God: essence and existence do not separate and, ultimately, identify themselves. In God, given the definition of causa sui, this identity is “easi...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) |
| Repositorio: | Revista Dois Pontos (Curitiba. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/66706 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ufpr.br/doispontos/article/view/66706 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Causality Theory of Definition Essence Existence Conatus Spinoza. causalidade teoria da definição essência existência conatus Espinosa. |
| Sumario: | In the deduction of conatus in Part III of Ethics, Spinoza presents the same conclusion to the finite modes that he did in Part I concerning the power of God: essence and existence do not separate and, ultimately, identify themselves. In God, given the definition of causa sui, this identity is “easily” explained in the case of modes. However, there seems to be a greater difficulty since, according to the de Deo, their essence does not involve existence. How can we reconcile two irreconcilable ideas, an “essence that does not involve existence”, with the intrinsic and necessary relation between essence and existence? How can we maintain that similar to substance, the essence and the existence of the modes do not separate? What binds one to another? This article proposes to clarify these questions through the articulation of two important themes in Spinoza’s philosophy: the notion of causality and the theory of definition. |
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