On the accommodation of arguments based on ethical doctrines in Rainer Forst's theory of democracy
The goal of this paper is to argue that Rainer Forst’s theory of democracy may be more receptive to arguments based in ethical doctrines (religious or not) than it at first seems. To do so, Forst’s general normative approach will be briefly exposed, followed by an exposition of his theory of democra...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
| Repositorio: | Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.ufc:article/19146 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19146 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Forst. Democracia. Esfera Pública. Forst. Democracy. Public Sphere. |
| Sumario: | The goal of this paper is to argue that Rainer Forst’s theory of democracy may be more receptive to arguments based in ethical doctrines (religious or not) than it at first seems. To do so, Forst’s general normative approach will be briefly exposed, followed by an exposition of his theory of democracy. Then, there will be stressed two features of such approach that may allow for such receptivity, and how they do so. Finally, it will be argued in the conclusion that such features allow for Forst’s approach to transit, albeit in a limited degree, between two extremes which must be equally avoided by any appropriate theory of democracy: the exclusion of some groups and the oppression of others. |
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