Philosophical disagreement versus philosophical knowledge
We will argue that philosophical disagreement gives us good reasons to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge. First, we will present the case of PHILOSOPHERS to produce a skeptical verdict when it comes to philosophical disagreements. Then, we will discuss the symmetry and centrality conditions...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/253892 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/253892 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | epistemic peers philosophical disagreement skepticism metaphilosophy pares epistêmicos desacordo filosófico ceticismo meta-filosofia |
| Sumario: | We will argue that philosophical disagreement gives us good reasons to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge. First, we will present the case of PHILOSOPHERS to produce a skeptical verdict when it comes to philosophical disagreements. Then, we will discuss the symmetry and centrality conditions to clarify why PHILOSOPHERS yields a skeptical verdict. Both conditions make philosophical disagreement an undefeated defeater for our philosophical beliefs. Second, we will discuss the Equal Weight (EW) as the view that requires parties to a disagreement to suspend judgment if parties comply with the symmetry and centrality conditions. Finally, we will discuss Kelly’s (2016) arguments against the skeptical outcomes of EW when applied to philosophical disagreement. We conclude that Kelly’s defense fails to defuse the skeptical outcomes of EW applied to philosophical disagreement. |
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