Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views
In my recent book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I put forward a sustained critique of originalism in all its forms and defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the U. S. Constitution and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional int...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/11067 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/11067 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Constitutional interpretation fidelity in constitutional interpretation moral reading of a Constitution justice-seeking constitutional theory originalism precedent |
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Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five ViewsFleming, James E.Constitutional interpretationfidelity in constitutional interpretationmoral reading of a Constitutionjustice-seeking constitutional theoryoriginalismprecedentIn my recent book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I put forward a sustained critique of originalism in all its forms and defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the U. S. Constitution and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. In this essay for the UNAM symposium on the book, I reply to five thoughtful commentaries. First, as against Barber’s commentary, I justify responding to the “persistent resurgence of originalism” and attempting to “save the new originalists from themselves” by showing the extent to which many of them acknowledge the need to make moral judgments in constitutional interpretation. Second, in appreciation of Imer Flores’s commentary, I draw a distinction between being a systematic moral reader and acknowledging the need to make normative judgments in constitutional interpretation. Third, I resist Ken Kersch’s interpretation and criticism of my project as “calling the fight” for “aspirationalism” over “historicism”—I mean instead to argue for the superiority of moral readings (which combine what he calls “aspirationalism” or justification and “historicism” or fit) over originalisms. Fourth, I embrace Linda McClain’s careful analysis of originalisms versus moral readings in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), protecting the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples, as confirming my argument that “inclusive originalism” includes practically everything that a moral reader would be likely to argue for. Finally, in response to Lawrence Sager, I bring out the affinities between his well-known “justice-seeking” constitutional theory and my own moral reading, and I argue that both theories reflect conceptions of fidelity as honoring our aspirational principles, not simply following our historical practices in the manner of conventional originalisms.Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM2017-03-17info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/1106710.22201/iij.24487937e.2017.11.11067Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho; Número 11, enero-diciembre de 2017Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho; Número 11, enero-diciembre de 20172448-79372007-438710.22201/iij.24487937e.2017.11reponame:Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derechoinstname:UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICOinstacron:UNAMenghttps://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/11067/13089Derechos de autor 2017 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Méxicoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/110672024-08-16T18:21:22Z |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views |
| title |
Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views |
| spellingShingle |
Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views Fleming, James E. Constitutional interpretation fidelity in constitutional interpretation moral reading of a Constitution justice-seeking constitutional theory originalism precedent |
| title_short |
Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views |
| title_full |
Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views |
| title_fullStr |
Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views |
| title_sort |
Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Views |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Fleming, James E. |
| author |
Fleming, James E. |
| author_facet |
Fleming, James E. |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Constitutional interpretation fidelity in constitutional interpretation moral reading of a Constitution justice-seeking constitutional theory originalism precedent |
| topic |
Constitutional interpretation fidelity in constitutional interpretation moral reading of a Constitution justice-seeking constitutional theory originalism precedent |
| description |
In my recent book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I put forward a sustained critique of originalism in all its forms and defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the U. S. Constitution and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. In this essay for the UNAM symposium on the book, I reply to five thoughtful commentaries. First, as against Barber’s commentary, I justify responding to the “persistent resurgence of originalism” and attempting to “save the new originalists from themselves” by showing the extent to which many of them acknowledge the need to make moral judgments in constitutional interpretation. Second, in appreciation of Imer Flores’s commentary, I draw a distinction between being a systematic moral reader and acknowledging the need to make normative judgments in constitutional interpretation. Third, I resist Ken Kersch’s interpretation and criticism of my project as “calling the fight” for “aspirationalism” over “historicism”—I mean instead to argue for the superiority of moral readings (which combine what he calls “aspirationalism” or justification and “historicism” or fit) over originalisms. Fourth, I embrace Linda McClain’s careful analysis of originalisms versus moral readings in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), protecting the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples, as confirming my argument that “inclusive originalism” includes practically everything that a moral reader would be likely to argue for. Finally, in response to Lawrence Sager, I bring out the affinities between his well-known “justice-seeking” constitutional theory and my own moral reading, and I argue that both theories reflect conceptions of fidelity as honoring our aspirational principles, not simply following our historical practices in the manner of conventional originalisms. |
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2017 |
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2017-03-17 |
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article |
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https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/11067 10.22201/iij.24487937e.2017.11.11067 |
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https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/11067 |
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10.22201/iij.24487937e.2017.11.11067 |
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eng |
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eng |
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https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/11067/13089 |
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Derechos de autor 2017 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Derechos de autor 2017 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
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application/pdf |
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Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM |
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Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM |
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Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho; Número 11, enero-diciembre de 2017 Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho; Número 11, enero-diciembre de 2017 2448-7937 2007-4387 10.22201/iij.24487937e.2017.11 reponame:Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho instname:UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO instacron:UNAM |
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